Alas, not an animal loving post - I'm not into that sort of thing. It is a long one, however, almost as long as my arm (though I wish it were as long as something else)*.
18 years ago, an Indian peacekeeping contingent was sent into Sri Lanka, to help the Sinhalese Government combat LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) terrorism and sectarianism, which had plagued the country since 1976.
Our efforts were found wanting. Not only was Indian military performance poor, the head politicos back in New Delhi had trouble reaching a concensus on a course of action to take. Indeed, in some cases, leading politicians questioned whether India should have sent in a peacekeeping contingent (named the IPKF) in the first place, when the LTTE, a Hindu Tamil group, had roots in India. Some may say this point of view was vindicated when Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated by Tigers in 1990, after the IPKF withdrew but, in the intial stages of the conflict, this lead to chaos and confusion.
An objective after-action analysis conducted by the Indian Ministry of Defence (MoD) concluded that unclear political objectives and miscommunication between military and political leaders was the main cause of the IPKF's failure to bring Northern Sri Lanka under control.
It wouldn't be the first time.
Indeed, since Sri Lanka's independence in 1948, Indian governmental policies displayed little realpolitik, substituted with political correctness and a desire to appear non-partisan. An understanding of the geopolitics and history of Southern India and Sri Lanka is essential to understanding the roots of the conflict that plagued India's island neighbour since its inception.
When the British had complete control of Sri Lanka (called Ceylon), they transported thousands of Tamil labourers (since Tamil Nadu is the closest state to Ceylon) to work the tea farms there, mostly in the North. In those days, each tea farm had a British overseer and a Tamil liason to monitor and coordinate activities of the workers. After Sri Lanka's independence, the Tamil liasons took over the management of these tea farms, and swiftly grew wealthy, increasing the prosperity of the Tamil community as a whole.
On the other hand, the Sinhalese majority, many of whom were working as low-paid manual labourers and in general, servicing the British empire, were not as fortunate to receive established industries from the departing British. Those they did receive were grossly mismanaged, and this did not help the prosperity of the community much. As has been the case in many other countries, where a majority ethnic group is upset by the advancement of a educated and hard working minority (1930's Germany being a famous example) the result was a "Sinhala only" policy. This drove the Tamils out of traditional job and opportunities. As the educated class had no land to fall back on, frustration began building up. A methodical Sinhala wedge was driven between Vanni and Trincomalee district. With all major industries being handed to Sinhalas, the only economy to fall back on was smuggling. This eventually lead to the formation of many Tamil terrorist groups, like the LTTE, EROS and the ERPLF.
With the (rather long) history lesson over, we come now to the the crux of the situation - Indian overtures to Sri Lanka and their effectiveness.
The Indian government, in an effort to appear peaceful and un-hegemonistic (sp?), decided to back the Sinhalese-majority Government in its actions, and in an effort to enlist the nation's help as an ally in the region. Spurred by official backing from India, the Sri Lankan Government continued its policy of segregation and sinhalese chauvinism. This continued, with relatively little resistence from the Tamil minority, until 1976.
Up until then, India's support of Sri Lankan actions can be justified, because it was in our best interests to have an ally in the form of another subcontinental nation. After the Tamil insurgencies began, however, the Indian Government should have remained neutral or maintained a slight pro-Tamil stance, for several reasons. Chief amongst which is the fact that the Tamil minority has traditional ties to the Indian mainland, in a major Indian state, and the support of the majority of its people. Apart from this, Sri Lanka had long suspected ulterior motives to Indian support (as voiced by its then Foreign Minister), and decided to foster closer ties with Indian arch-rivals Pakistan and China (the majority of Sri Lanka's military inventory is now composed of weapons from these two nations). As an immediate corrective measure, the Indian Government should have patrtaken in gunboat diplomacy, an action which would have been very effective, seeing as how we had faced down the United States and defeated Pakistan not 5 years before. Unfortunately, no such action occurred, and Indian hopes of gaining an ally in Sri Lanka were dashed.
But hindsight is 20/20, and some may be justified in saying I'm being too harsh 30 years on. Perhaps. I believe it was Theodore Roosevelt who said "In any moment of decision the best thing you can do is the right thing, the next best thing is the wrong thing, and the worst thing you can do is nothing."
And that was the problem. India did nothing. No formal complaints, no calling in political favours and hell, not even an attempt at bribery to secure us some support in Sri Lankan Government. Remeber those unclear political goals we spoke of earlier? They were the main cause. For once, Indian foreign policy lost all the aura of rancour and action that surrounded it, and remained mute, tolerating a diplmatic insult tantamount to a fist in the face.
The 1970's were the time to establish Indian dominance in the subcontinent. It had dismembered Pakistan, brought Nepal and Bhutan into its sphere of influence, and could have successfully countered China's ambitions in Burma, which is now a permanent thorn in India's side, with its Chinese listening posts and surveillance systems. We failed to capitalise on the oppurtunity, and Sri Lanka is the best example of this.
After Rajiv Gandhi took power in the eighties, the Indo-Lankan accord was signed. This was another major mishandling of relations, a misguided Indian attempt to retain the alliance that never was. 4,176 dead Indian troops was the result. Troops who died fighting another nation's war. Why India attempted to help a nation that had effectively snubbed it is beyond me, but it is clear that someone in the Indian Foreign Office had not had their coffee (or perhaps tea?) that morning.
After the IPKF withdrawal, the LTTE resumed their offensive and took control of a large part of the country. They were in their strongest position ever, and had Rajiv Gandhi's Government decided to, they could have supported the Tigers now, and in a swift move, gained power and influence over Sri Lankan foreign policy. The LTTE had, in fact, sent peace feelers to the Indian Government.
As usual, we did nothing. Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated.
Some may criticise me for saying we should support a terrorist group and, make no bones about it, the LTTE is a terrorist organisation. After all, isnt India itself plagued by terrorist insurgencies in its North and Northeastern territories? It is, and we have had to kowtow to our enemies as a result, with Pakistan, China and Burma being the prime beneficiaries. The moral argument is void when it comes to national interests. If India has no qualms supporting Baloch seperatists in Pakistan, Uigher seperatists in China or the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, it shouldnt have any qualms doing so in Sri Lanka**. And lets face it, the potential benefits of having a pro-Indian Sri Lankan foreign policy are boundless - power projection and diplomatic leverage just tips of the iceberg.
* With due credit to 'Lock, Stock, and two Smoking Barrels' for this ever-venerable line.
** To be clear, I'm not supporting a Tamil Government (although some Tamil representation in Sri Lankan Parliament wouldn't be such a bad thing). Rather, my intention is to highlight how to use the LTTE to gain influence over Sri Lankan foreign policy and to mould it to India's national interests.
